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TIMOTHY L. COGGINS AND SARAH G. HOLTERHOFF 1

Instead of relying on the voodoo information taken from the Internet, Plaintiff must
hunt for hard copy back-up documentation in admissible form .... 2

The quotation above from St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., a 1999 US federal
district court case, captures a perception of the trustworthiness of digital information
that over ten years later is, in many instances, still uncomfortably close to reality. It raises
two important questions with which governments providing online information and
users of that information must grapple: Is digital government information reliable and
trustworthy? Has the government entity providing digital information online taken the
care necessary to ensure its authenticity?
This chapter presents a historical perspective of authenticity of government
information, provides definitions of significantterms and phrases related to authentication,
offers basic descriptions of some methods used to ensure authenticity of government
information, and identifies some examples of what is happening at the federal and state
level in the United States and in other countries to address these important questions.
It also suggests some strategies and appropriate steps toward the goal of an affirmative
answer to the two questions under consideration. The authors are both law librarians,
and the examples used in this chapter are government-issued legal information. However,
the principles, processes, and concepts identified in this chapter should be applied to all
types of digital government information. 3

The authors thank Matthew R. Farley (J.D., 2010, University of Richmond School of Law), Reference Intern at the
University of Richmond School of Law Library, for his valuable research assistance.
2

St. Clair v. fohnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. Zd 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999).

Authentication of government-issued information is a complex issue that is difficult to address thoroughly in this
3
chapter; therefore, a list of suggested readings and resources appears at the end of the chapter for those who would like
to learn more about authentication.
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Authenticity and the Transition
Throughout the history of the written word, an important issue with recorded
information has been its integrity, both the accuracy and the completeness of the content.
Painstaking copying of manuscripts began in medieval monasteries and continued in
universities, with care taken to maintain uniformity and to avoid corruption of the text.
Royal monarchs confirmed the authenticity of their official edicts, orders, decrees, and
declarations by stamping them with a special seal. The advent of the printing press made
the accurate reproduction of information content much easier to achieve. When early
printers needed to provide a warranty of reliability for their work and to protect it from
fraud, they added unique printers' marks to their publications. In the developing print
culture, a fundamental factor ensuring the integrity of documents was the fixed nature
of the print medium.
With the transition to the age of digital information, 4 particularly information made
available on websites, the integrity of recorded information surfaces once again as an
issue. In recent years national and state governments have turned increasingly to digital
format for their official publications. Government information can be created, updated,
and distributed in digital format with greater speed and efficiency than is possible with
print format. Users of government information have enjoyed expanded access and
greater ease of use with digital formats. However, the change to a digital environment
highlights a new set of information management issues. Concern has been growing in
some quarters about the substitution of digital sources for print ones without proper care
being taken to ensure the integrity of the digital versions and to preserve the content.
Guarantees of authenticity such as seals, printers' marks, and the fixed nature of the
print medium do not transfer to the digital age. With an explosion in the quantity and
accessibility of information, the need to confirm its integrity, for legal and research
purposes in particular, looms as a major issue.
Many have raised concerns about digital government publications being vulnerable
to alteration or corruption of the content accidentally or maliciously, as well as the effect
that alterations and corruption may have on national security. The flexibility that the
digital format provides is also a fundamental reason for concern. The fluid character
and elastic, changeable nature of digital media require technological solutions to protect
and preserve the integrity of the information and new types of seals or marks to signify
authenticity to users of the information. In the prefatory note to a uniform law that
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is drafting
about authentication, the Drafting Committee highlights this issue:
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Definitions
Electronic legal information moves from its originating computer through a series of
other computers or servers until it eventually reaches the individual consumer. The
information is susceptible to being altered, whether accidentally or maliciously, at each
transfer. Any such alterations are virtually undetectable. A major issue raised by the

4
When referring to information in computerized or online format, the most technically accurate and precise term is
"digital." However, the term "electronic" also is commonly used to indicate the same format. This chapter will generally
use the former of the terms; some of the cited sources employ the latter in the same context.
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change to an electronic environment, therefore, is whether the information consulted
by consumers is trustworthy, or authentic. 5
More about the draft uniform law will appear later in this chapter.
With the move from paper to digital formats, it is necessary for governments to adopt
technology and best practices and to adhere to standards to ensure a level of trust in
the authenticity of their digital documents, similar to that enjoyed by the print format,
and to preserve the integrity of the information. While digital provision of government
information has many benefits, the authenticity of content provided in this format must
be safeguarded and its preservation guaranteed. The concept of authentic and reliable
government information must be redefined for the digital age.
Why does authentication matter? According to the US Government Printing Office,
the official disseminator of federal government information in print format for over 150
years and more recently in digital format as well, "In the 21st century, the increasing
use of electronic documents poses special challenges in verifying authenticity, because
digital technology makes such documents easy to alter or copy, leading to multiple, nonidentical versions that can be used in unauthorized or illegitimate ways." 6
In particular, legal information that is understood to be both official and authentic
is at risk in the digital age. When using print legal materials, it is usually clear that the
documents are official and authentic because of the fixed nature of the content once it has
been printed (and sometimes because of a seal, stamp, or official binding or format). The
text is easily verifiable, and any changes would be readily detectible. Additionally, print
legal information typically exists in multiple, identical copies held in various locations,
with that redundancy providing relative assurance that the authoritative content will be
preserved. In contrast, authenticity is much less obvious with digital sources. They are
inherently susceptible to corruption or tampering, and they are not trustworthy unless
they are able to be authenticated using encryption-based methods. Digital information
needs to be authenticated and verified to be the accurate, complete, and unaltered
version, and measures for its long-term preservation must be taken.
Librarians, particularly law librarians, are increasingly concerned about the lack
of attention to authentication shown by most governments as they replace print
publications with digital versions. The American Association of Law Libraries raised the
authentication and preservation issues over a decade ago, and law librarians in the US
and other countries have begun efforts to bring the matter to the attention of officials of
their national and state governments.

nitions
For a clear understanding of authentication and related issues, the definitions of certain
key words and phrases are important.
Authentication is the process of verifying that a document is authentic and that no
alterations in the document occurred in its route from the producer of the document to
5
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Law Commission), Prefatory Note,
Authentication and Preservation of State Electronic Legal Materials Act (2010).
6

Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/authentication/index.html.
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the recipient. Others describe authentication as validation of a user, computer, or some
digital object to ensure that it is what it claims to be.
Authenticity describes the quality of being authentic or of established authority
for truth and correctness. It typically refers to the quality and credibility of the digital
document and covers issues such as genuineness, legitimacy, undisputed credibility,
believability, and trustworthiness.
Certification is the process that is used to ensure that a digital object is authentically
the content issued by the author or the issuer. A certificate is a mark of veracity that
conveys certification information to users and is in some way joined to the object itself.
Chain of custody (confidence or responsibility) refers to the verifiable record of the
sequential steps in the handling of a digital document, usually beginning with a certified
original text. Chain of custody normally utilizes certification and digital signatures.
Digital signature and electronic signature are slightly different terms. An electronic
signature is a generic, technology neutral term that refers to the many different ways that
a person can sign an electronic record. Electronic signatures include signatures such as
those typed at the end of an email message, a secret code or PIN, or a unique biometricsbased identifier such as a finger print. A digital signature is an electronic symbol, sound,
or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record. The digital signature is used to authenticate the
identity of the sender or of the signer of a document and to ensure the integrity of the
original content of a document.
Digital (or electronic) document is data that is recorded or stored on any medium
(technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or
similar capabilities) in or by a computer system or other similar device and that can be
read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other similar device. The words
11
digital 11 and "electronic" are often used interchangeably.
Official version is a document either in paper format or disseminated digitally that
is governmentally mandated or approved by statute or rule by authorities. Digital and
paper versions of a document may be equal in status. Frequently today, however, the
paper version may be the only version that is designated as official. In some instances,
the digital version may be the only official version. In other situations, there may not be
an official version because a court, for example, might elect to discontinue publishing its
own reporter for its decisions and rely instead on an unofficial commercial version.
Permanent public access refers to a government policy and practice that ensures
applicable government information is preserved for current, continuous, and future
public access.
Prima facie evidence of the law denotes evidence in common law jurisdictions that
would be sufficient to prove a particular proposition or fact unless that evidence is
rebutted. Official versions of documents are prima facie evidence of the law in most
jurisdictions. Section 5 of the draft NCCUSL uniform act indicates that "[e]lectronic legal
material authenticated under Section 4 [of this Act] is presumed to be a true and correct
copy of the legal material. 11
Reliability is a broader term that covers concepts such as authoritative character,
official status, and integrity.
Definitions of other terms, including public key infrastructure, biometrics, and
cryptography, appear in the next section of this chapter.
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The purpose of authentication as it relates to government information-to ensure the
integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of a document and to confirm that a document
is what it purports to be-is widely understood, even if many governments have not
actually taken the necessary steps to authenticate their documents. The technological
methods used to ensure authenticity, however, are not as well understood and may be
nearly unintelligible for those who lack scientific or computer expertise. An example of
authentication that is familiar to everyone-helping ensure that an individual is the person
that he or she claims to be-provides a good illustration of authentication generally.
Here are some commonly used types of user authentication technology that help to
ensure that an individual is the person that he or she claims to be.

PASSWORDS
Passwords, the most common and least expensive form of authentication technology,
require a user to remember a string of characters and enter this information to gain access
to a desired resource or service. Problems with passwords as a form of authentication
technology include the frequent sharing of passwords, the tendency to leave them
unchanged for long periods, the reuse of a password across multiple accounts, and the use
of overly simplistic passwords. Owners of passwords with one or more of these problems
are at risk of falling prey to novice identity thieves or simple hacking tools. Passwords
play an important role in user authentication, but they should be used in conjunction
with other technologies for adequate security.
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Token devices such as magnetic strips (credit cards), smart cards, identification cards, and
USB keys typically last longer than passwords and are more difficult to hack or reproduce.
They provide little protection, however, if lost or stolen. Similar to passwords, simple
possession of these objects often serves as the only means to distinguish the owner.
Tokens are more effective if they are combined with something else such as a PIN code
or a password.

KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
Public key infrastructure (PKI) refers to authentication technology that uses digital
certificates, which are often issued by an independent certificate authority. The certificate
authority acts as a third-party reference regarding the identity of the owner or the
integrity of the content. The certificate can be attached to email messages or references
by a Web browser during an e-commerce transaction as a means of identification. When
applications encounter these certificates, the origin can be verified by inquiring back to
the issuing certificate or certification authority to ensure the identity of the sender or
the website owner. Digital certificates also provide a means to allow users to exchange
highly secure, encrypted information using a combination of a private key (owned by
the sender) and public key (freely shared with recipients) to encrypt and decrypt message
text. While PKI has seen very limited use in the marketplace as an application to affirm
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that an individual is, in fact, the person that he or she claims to be, it is viewed as
essential for the authentication of digital government information.

BIOMETRICS
Biometric devices examine unique physical characteristics to differentiate one person
from another. Biometric verification, using fingerprints, irises, voice patterns, or facial
patterns, is considered to be highly secure because these physical characteristics are
unique to each individual and cannot be easily duplicated. The reliability of biometrics
can be strengthened further by combining several types of recognition, known as
multiple biometrics, and/or requiring users to enter a PIN code in order to provide a
unique self-identification.

Applying Authentication Technology to Digital Government
Information
To authenticate digital government information, governments are using some of the
same types of technology used in user authentication, as well as other technology such
as digital certificates and certification, cryptography, digital signatures, and seals of
authenticity. The primary purpose of these technologies is to ensure the integrity of the
content and to give reasonable assurance to users of the information that a document is
what it purports to be (reliability) and that it can be used and cited by a person for what
it claims to be (trustworthiness). Following are brief descriptions of these commonly used
types of technology.

PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
Public key infrastructure is a system of hardware, software, policies, and people that
provides a range of security assurances, including authentication, data integrity, data
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. PKis provide a desired level of trust using public
key-based cryptographic techniques to generate and manage electronic certificates.
Certificates link one individual or entity to a public key. The public key validates the
information provided by the individual or entity or facilitates data encryption. Certificates
verify digital signatures (providing authentication and data integrity) and facilitate data
encryption (providing confidentiality). If designed and implemented correctly, a PKI
can ensure that a given digital signature is properly linked to the individual or entity
associated with it (providing non-repudiation) and can satisfy the criteria used to evaluate
systems that produce electronic signatures.

DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Digital signatures are a document-dependent way of encrypting information by applying
asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric encryption uses a key pair, consisting of a private
and a public key. To sign a document digitally, the first step is creation of a hash value.
The hash value is the result of a mathematical calculation (using algorithms also called
hash functions), which transforms the document into a string of a certain length. The

hash value is signed subsE
The addressee can check
to the digital signature a
further ensures the inte~
document is tampered wi
Digital signatures pre
the PKI discussion: autf
signature guarantees tha
or altered. The digital si
information has been pn
signature represents that
denying that the inform<
A digital signature t
identity. A digital certifi
a trusted intermediary c
Certification of a signatu
that a notary is a physica

DIGITAL CERTIFICATES

A digital certificate is an
a public key and a sped
public key, and other ide1
directory or other databa
certificate or certification
in the certificate does, i
certification authority d
certificates, and oversees
of digital certificates. A '
such as the starting date

CRYPTOGRAPHY

Cryptography is a form
contents of a documen
in order to hide the co
modification through tr
comparable to a lock, ar
by clicking the lock to it:
can unlock (the decrypti
There are three con
(secret key) cryptograf
cryptography. Symmetri
the information sender
algorithms are well suitt
integrity and origin of
to create the unique co

1st Century

aims to be, it is viewed as
tation.

:o differentiate one person
es, voice patterns, or facial
Jhysical .characteristics are
'he reliability of biometrics
of recognition, known as
:ode in order to provide a

tal Government

1ts are using some of the
l as other technology such
l signatures, and seals of
ensure the integrity of the
nation that a document is
cited by a person for what
is of these commonly used

policies, and people that
1tion, data integrity, data
evel of trust using public
ectronic certificates.
te public key validates the
ta encryption. Certificates
:egrity) and facilitate data
emented correctly, a PKI
> the individual or entity
ie criteria used to evaluate

information by applying
1r, consisting of a private
creation of a hash value.
ag algorithms also called
of a certain length. The

Authenticating Digital Government Information 139

hash value is signed subsequently by the signer's private key and added to the document.
The addressee can check the origin of the document by applying the signer's public key
to the digital signature and checking whether the hashes match. The digital signature
further ensures the integrity of the document, because the hash value changes if the
document is tampered with or altered.
Digital signatures provide for the three security assurances mentioned above under
the PKI discussion: authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. The digital
signature guarantees that the document is authentic and has not been tampered with
or altered. The digital signature ensures confidentiality because it represents that the
information has been protected from unauthorized viewing and use. Finally, the digital
signature represents that the sender will not repudiate the information by subsequently
denying that the information emanated from him or her.
A digital signature by itself cannot provide sufficient evidence of the signatory's
identity. A digital certificate issued by a trusted third party, sometimes referred to as
a trusted intermediary or trust service provider, links the signature to the signatory.
Certification of a signature in this way increases certainty and trust, in the same manner
that a notary is a physical witness to manuscript signatures.

DIGITAL CERTIFICATES AND CERTIFICATION
A digital certificate is an electronic credential that guarantees the association between
a public key and a specific entity. It is created by adding the entity's name, the entity's
public key, and other identifying information in an electronic document that is sorted in a
directory or other database. The digital certificate, created by a trusted third party called a
certificate or certification authority, provides the assurance that the public key contained
in the certificate does, indeed, belong to the individual named in the certificate. The
certification authority digitally signs the certificate, is responsible for managing digital
certificates, and oversees the generation, distribution, renewal, revocation, and suspension
of digital certificates. A certification authority may also set restrictions on a certificate,
such as the starting date for which the certificate is valid as well as its expiration date.

CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography is a form of secret writing that uses codes and ciphers to conceal the
contents of a document or message. It transforms messages into unintelligible forms
in order to hide the content, to establish its authenticity, and to prevent undetected
modification through the use of an algorithm and a key to function. The algorithm is
comparable to a lock, and the key operates the lock. Any person can lock a door simply
by clicking the lock to its closed position (the encryption), but only the owner of the lock
can unlock (the decryption) the lock.
There are three commonly used classes of cryptographic mechanisms: symmetric
(secret key) cryptography; secure hash functioning; and asymmetric (public key)
cryptography. Symmetric (secret key) cryptography is a class of algorithms where both
the information sender and the information recipient share a secret key. Symmetric
algorithms are well suited for confidentiality. They can also be used to authenticate the
integrity and origin of data, since only the sender and the recipient have the ability
to create the unique coded text. For example, the sender could code a portion of the
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message, and the recipient could code the same portion of receipt in order to verify the
accuracy of the algorithm the sender used, and thus verify identity. However, it is difficult
to establish the initial shared key, and most users resort to a trusted third party to do so.
Asymmetric (public key) cryptography occurs when one party has a private key and
the other party has a corresponding public key. The data encrypted with one key can be
decrypted with the other key. For example, coded messages generated with the private
key can be accessed by all those with a public key, and information coded with the public
key can be decrypted by the private key holder. Asymmetric algorithms, well suited for
authentication and integrity, are used to perform three operations: (1) digital signatures,
(2) key transport, and (3) key assignment.
Secure hash functioning takes a stream of data and reduces it to a fixed size through
a one-way (irreversible) mathematical function. The result is a "digest," which can be
reproduced and verified by any party with the same stream of data and secure hash.
Secure hash functioning can ensure integrity, but it can provide authentication only if
the parties share a secret key. A significant issue associated with hash functioning at this
time, however, is that the document has to be re-signed since algorithms expire over
time.

Tech

Cu

Are some of the above technologies or others methods already being used by governments
for the purpose of authenticating their government information? This section provides
illustrations of such uses within the United States. The first example shows how the
US Government Printing Office is using authentication technology and PDF versions
of documents to ensure the authenticity of some important government information
sources, including primary legal materials. The next examples illustrate what some states
within the United States are doing to ensure the authenticity of primary sources of the
law, such as administrative regulations and court opinions.

UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Users of US Government Printing Office (GPO) publications in print format have been
able to rely upon the authenticity of the content of those documents. In the 1980s,
GPO began supplementing or replacing print documents with tangible electronic format
versions (floppy disks and CD-ROMs). With the evolution of the Internet that began in
the 1990s, increasing use of digital format for the publication of government information
has made authentication of the contents a major issue. GPO has recognized that digital
technology makes documents easy to alter or copy, introducing the possibility of multiple
non-identical versions that could be used in unauthorized or illegitimate ways.
In order to disseminate, protect, and preserve information from all three branches
of government, GPO has launched its Federal Digital System or FDsys. 7 This system

7
See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys. As of December 20, 2010, FDsys became GPO's official system of record for online
government information. FDsys describes itself now as the location to access "America's Authentic Government
Information."
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provides no-fee digital access to official and authenticated versions of federal government
information submitted by Congress and Federal agencies. FDsys is also intended to
preserve the information as technology changes. It is replacing and improving an earlier
system, GPO Access.
FDsys has three roles: as a system to manage content, as a repository to preserve
content, and as an advanced search engine. It securely controls digital content throughout
its lifecycle to ensure content integrity and authenticity. It follows archival system
standards to ensure long-term preservation and access of digital content. Its search engine
combines extensive metadata creation with modern search technology.
GPO uses a digital certificate to apply digital signatures to the official content of
certain documents in PDF format after the validity of the content has been confirmed,
providing assurance that the documents have not been altered since GPO disseminated
them. At this time, the chain of custody that GPO provides begins in most cases when
GPO receives the content and does not extend back to the content originator. However,
one example in which an uninterrupted chain of certificates currently does exist is the
Budget of the US Government (FY 2010 and FY 2011), for which GPO received content
using a PKI signature. In order for users to validate the certificate that was used by GPO
to apply a digital signature to the document, a chain of custody or a certification path
between the certificate and an established point of trust is established. Every certificate
within that path must be checked. The software required for validating digital signatures
on PDF documents is Adobe Acrobat or Reader, version 7.0 or higher. The technology
used to certify these documents allows GPO to secure the data integrity and provides
users with assurance that the content is unchanged since GPO disseminated it.
In addition to certifying a document, GPO uses digital signature technology to
add a visible Seal of Authenticity to authenticated and certified PDF documents. When
GPO signs and certifies a document, a blue ribbon icon appears to the left of the Seal
of Authenticity and in the Signatures tab within Adobe Acrobat or Reader. When users
print a document that has been signed and certified by GPO, the Seal of Authenticity will
automatically print on the document, but the blue ribbon will not print. The GPO Seal
of Authenticity is a graphic of an eagle next to the words "Authenticated US Government
Information." This seal notifies users that a document has been authenticated by GPO.
By using digital signature technology to add the Seal to a PDF document, GPO attests that
the document has not been altered since it was authenticated and disseminated by GPO.
A digital file that has been digitally signed and certified by GPO includes identifying
information and the statement that "GPO attests that this document has not been altered
since it was disseminated by GPO." A digital signature, viewed through the GPO Seal
of Authenticity, verifies document integrity and authenticity of GPO online Federal
documents, at no charge to users. The visible digital signatures on online PDF documents
serve the same purpose as handwritten signatures or traditional wax seals on printed
documents. Documents that have been authenticated by GPO by mid-2010 include such
primary sources of law as public and private laws from 1995 forward (digitally signed
and certified, containing GPO's Seal of Authenticity, using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
technology), the current edition of the US Code, the Statutes at Large (2003-2006), and the
Code of Federal Regulations (select years). Among other digital documents authenticated
at this time are Congressional bills from 1993 forward (new bills are authenticated as they

I.
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are posted), the Federal Register, Presidential documents, and the Budget of the United
States for FY 2010 and FY 2011 (digitally signed and certified PDF files). 8

STATES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Within the past ten years, state governments in the US have been transitioning rapidly
from paper to digital publication of their primary legal sources-statutes, court decisions,
and regulations-without fully considering the implications of those changes. The move
to digital publication of former print sources saves money and provides easier access
to these sources for many public users. However, in nearly all cases, states have not
adopted procedures to authenticate the new digital information or to provide a reliable
infrastructure to preserve it. While a number of states have digital signature laws that apply
to online business transactions and administrative matters, this use of digital technology
has not carried over to such government functions as the publication of primary legal
sources. Use of authentication technology for e-business and e-government is viewed
as cost-effective, while employing the same technology to protect other types of state
government information may be viewed as unnecessarily and prohibitively expensive.
States are embracing online, digital publication dissemination to save printing costs, and
the prospect of adding authentication expenses as a budget item is not a welcome one.
As of mid-2010, most US states are not using technology such as encryption, public
key infrastructure, or digital signatures to authenticate the digital legal publications
provided on their government websites. Some states do include disclaimers to point out
that the digital versions of primary legal sources provided on their websites lack official
status and/or are not authenticated. For example, posted along with the Minnesota
statutes that appear on the state government website is the following message:
Information on this website is not intended to replace the official versions. However,
every attempt has been made to ensure that the information on this website is accurate
and timely. The website is presented 'as is' and without warranties, either express or
implied, including warranties regarding the content of this information. 9
Despite the general lack of state action on the matter of authentication, a few states have
begun to recognize and address the issue for one or more of the digital legal resources
posted on their websites.

DELAWARE
Delaware is authenticating and certifying its online administrative documents and
some legislative documents (session laws). Delaware authenticates its online Delaware
Administrative Code by using digital signatures on PDF documents. While there is no
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As part of its strong and continuing focus on the topic, the US Government Printing Office convened a "Document
Authentication Workshop" on June 18, 2010 to seek input from federal agencies and the user community about
authentication. The workshop covered issues such as authentication for automated, high volume applications, standards
and methods for bulk data authentication, chain of custody, re-authentication over time, and granular authentication. At
the workshop GPO representatives mentioned that GPO is already making available bulk XML data for the Federal Register
and the Code of Federation Regulations, but this data is unsigned at this time and therefore not authentic or official.

10
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See http://delcode.delaware.:
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officially published compilation of the entire Delaware administrative code, the state makes
certain titles available on the state's website 10 and has begun certifying the authenticity of
those titles. The official version of the state session laws is Laws of the State of Delaware
(commonly called Laws of Delaware or Delaware Laws), published by the State of Delaware.
Session laws from 1999 to the present are available on the state's website 11 and are certified
as authentic. Online Delaware court documents have not been certified or authenticated.

OHIO
Ohio has begun to address the authentication of online legal resources, but only for one
source-Supreme Court of Ohio opinions. The opinions posted on the Court's website
are authenticated through the use of digital signatures. Ohio uses encryption-based
authentication procedures for all decisions, which are available as PDF files and are
searchable in the database on the Ohio Supreme Court website. 12 Each opinion opened in
Adobe Reader has a tab, either labeled "signatures" or identified by an icon representing a
pen and paper, which is incorporated into the document's frame. Under that tab, notations
indicate that the document is "signed by the Supreme Court." The opinions are unofficial.
Official versions of opinions are located in the print versions of Ohio Official Reports.

UTAH
In 2007 the Utah Division of Administrative Rules announced the addition of file
authentication to its website. Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MDS) authentication has been
added to publication files. An MDS hash is, in essence, a signature for a file. A user can
confirm the integrity of a specific file the user downloads by comparing the MDS hash
provided by the Division with one that the user generates. Various software packages are
available, many at no cost, that permit individuals to generate an MDS hash. If the hashes do
not match exactly, then the integrity of the file is in question. The Division provides an MDS
hash for the Utah State Bulletin, Utah State Digest, Utah Administrative Code and update
files, and Utah Administrative Rules Index of Changes in PDF, RTF, TXT and ZIP formats. 13

ARKANSAS
The state of Arkansas decided in 2009 to discontinue print publication of the Arkansas
Reports and Arkansas Appellate Reports and to designate the appellate decisions posted
on the state judiciary website as the official versions. Since then Arkansas officials have
explored ways to authenticate those digital opinions. They looked for a process that would
authenticate two versions of the court opinions-the "official original" (produced in
WordPerfect format) and the "official copy" (PDF used for dissemination). They wanted to
be able to warrant the chain of custody between the two versions and to ensure that the
files are protected from alteration or tampering. They sought and received input and advice
from Singlepoint (a United Kingdom-based company specializing in information integrity).
10

See http://regulations.delaware.gov/AdminCode/.

11

See http://delcode.delaware.gov/sessionlaws/.

12

See www.sconet.state.oh.us/.

13

All are available from http://www.rules.utah.gov/.
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Arkansas ultimately selected a technology to verify authenticity and detect tampering
by applying a unique digital fingerprint and time stamp to content files. When the
"official original" document (WordPerfect file) is entered into the Arkansas document
management system, it will be sealed automatically. The document will then undergo
a number of changes before being released as the "official copy" (PDF file). The file will
be automatically sealed at key stages in the process: renaming of the file, creation of
metadata, and addition of final amendments. On the state judiciary website, a user will
be able either to download the "official copy" PDF file for validation at a later date (using
an applet or small java application) or to validate the file as it is being downloaded.
Validation will indicate by whom the file was sealed and when the sealing occurred,
ensuring that the contents of the sealed file are authentic and have not changed. If the
sealed file has been tampered with in any way, the validation will fail. Arkansas began a
beta test of this new technology in June 2010. PDF files with an authenticating seal were
available for a short period. However, in late 2010, the PDF files no longer have seals of
authentication attached to them, and there is no indication at the website when the
court plans to begin using the authentication technology again.

Cu
Other countries are dealing with authentication of government-issued information as
well. Some countries are authenticating digital information already, while others are
working collaboratively within a union of member states to create the structure for general
acceptance of authentication technology, such as electronic signatures. The following
examples highlight the current use of authentication technology by two countries in
particular and the efforts of several international organizations.
AUSTRALIA-AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY LEGISLATION

The online version of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) legislation now reflects
fundamental changes to reassure users about the authenticity of the legislation. The ACT
Legislation Register website 14 includes the acts and ordinances as made and republished, as
well as other legislative instruments such as subordinate laws, disallowable instruments,
approved forms, notifiable instruments and commencement notices.
Users access authorized printed legislation on the website by downloading authorized
files from the ACT Legislation Register website and printing them. The website indicates
11
that a document printed from an authorized file is legally presumed to be an accurate copy
of the piece of legislation." The ACT Parliamentary Counsel's Office (PCO) implemented
authentication technology to provide the security necessary to make certain that the
downloaded files are true copies of ACT legislation. One important measure has been to
provide a secure website for the legislation register using a Verisign SSL certificate. Users
can verify that the website is legitimate by checking the certificate, and clicking on the
Verisign icon in the bottom right corner of the legislation register homepage.

14

See http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/.
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The Parliamentary Counsel's Office also digitally signs authorized documents, using
digital signatures to encrypt electronic documents by applying a mathematical code, or
private key, held securely by the PCO. A certificate (public key) confirms that the document
was created by the PCO and that the document has not been changed since the document
was last digitally signed. The public key can be downloaded from a digital signatures page
on the website. Users need only to download the public key once because it will then
apply to all digitally signed files on the legislation register. To use digital signatures, the
user needs Adobe Acrobat 5.0 or Acrobat Reader 5.1 or a higher version of the reader.
The PCO indicates that digital signatures will be applied also to authorized copies of
legislative materials, such as explanatory statements and bills presented to the Legislative
Assembly. These documents have the same legal status as authorized legislation.
FRANCE-LE JOURNAL OFFICIEL
Le Journal officiel de la Republique francaise contains laws, decrees, orders, circulars, and
nominal measures, listed according to the ministries responsible. It also includes collective
agreements, parliamentary information, opinions and communications, judicial and legal
announcements, concessions or requests for name changes, as well as other governmentissued information. All text published in the paper edition also can be consulted digitally
with a few exceptions. Acts related to the status and nationality of persons are published
exclusively in paper, most likely to protect the privacy of the individual. Regulatory
acts related to administration organization, public agents, the state budget, and other
independent public authorities are published exclusively on the Internet.
The legal basis for publishing information in France is the Constitution. Ordinance 2004164 of February 20, 2004 on the publication and enactment oflaws and certain administrative
acts established that the digital Le Journal officiel (in its authentic version) has the same legal
status as the paper edition. Le Journal officiel is available via the website Legifrance, 15 whose
mission is access to the law for the public. Legifrance provides access to French law, including
texts published in the official gazette, collective agreements, and the jurisprudence of courts
and tribunals. It also provides access to standards issued by the European institutions and
treaties and international agreements binding on France. Legifrance offers three search
modes for French law: theme (from the home page), simple, and expert.
The electronic Le Journal officiel, besides sharing official status with the paper edition,
is also equally authentic, due to the use of two types of electronic signatures. In most
cases XAdES with a high level of authentication (XML advanced electronic signature),
as a non-intrusive signature, is used, and PDF (IETF 2315/5652, aka PKCS#7) is used
as an intrusive signature. An AdES is an electronic signature that meets the following
requirements: uniquely linked to the signatory; capable of identifying the signatory;
created in a way that the signatory can maintain sole control; and linked to the data to
which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.
PKCS#7 refers to the public key cryptography standard that is probably the most widely
used to describe a general syntax for data that has cryptography applied to it, such as
digital signatures and digital envelopes. A secure server with certificate and a time stamp
is used with the software nCipher Appliance. A crypto box is used to secure the private
keys for the publication signature.
15

See http://www,legifrance.gouv.fr/.
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LEGAL GAZETIES GENERALLY

A legal gazette is typically the publication of a government that reports actions taken by
its various branches, such as new legislation and regulations. The website of the European
Forum of Official Gazettes provides detailed information about the official gazettes of
various countries, including whether or not the country has taken steps to ensure the
authenticity of the information provided in the digital version of the gazettes. 16 The
European Forum of Official Gazettes was created in 2004 by the organizations responsible
for publishing the official gazettes of the European Union member states and the Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities. The objective of the Forum is to
exchange ideas and information on publication processes, technology and best practices
between the official publishers. For each country, the website provides the details of the
legal gazette for that country such as what is included and whether or not the paper
and digital editions are both legally binding. For example, in this section of the report
about Estonia's legal gazette, it states: "Since June 2002 the paper and the electronic
editions have been equally authentic. The Thawte web server certificate based on the
HTTPS protocol is used to guarantee the workflow and authentication procedures of
the electronically published text." 17 Other information provided in the entry for each
member state's gazette includes the details of the publishing institution, the drafting
and publishing procedures, the collections of consolidated legislation, and the legislative
portals and online databases.
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Although primarily directed to the "internal market" and with the needs of businesses
and commerce as a primary purpose, Directive 1999/93 of the European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union, dated December 13, 1999, established a European
framework for digital signatures and encryption. The purpose of the Directive, as
outlined in Article l of the Directive, is to "facilitate the use of electronic signatures and
to contribute to their legal recognition. It [the Directive] establishes a legal framework
for electronic signatures and certain certification-services in order to ensure the proper
functioning of the internal marker." Article 2 includes definitions of electronic signature,
advanced electronic signature, certificate, certification service provider, signatory and
other terms used in the Directive. Article 2, section 2, defines an /1 advanced electronic
signature" as an electronic signature that meets the following requirements: (a) uniquely
linked to the signatory; (b) capable of identifying the signatory; (c) created using means
that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and (d) linked to the data to
which it relates in such a manner than any subsequent change of the date is detectable.
Article 5 outlines the effect of electronic signatures in member states. This Article
indicates that member states should ensure that advanced electronic signatures that are
based on a qualified certificate and that are created by a secure signature creation device
satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in electronic form, just
as a handwritten signature satisfies these requirements in relation to paper-based data.
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See http://circa.europa.eu/irc/ opoce/ojf/info/ data/prod/html/index.htm.
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Moreover, Article 5 states that advanced electronic signatures should be admissible as
evidence in legal proceedings.
Although this Directive does not focus on the authentication of government-issued
information, it does establish a framework for the use of electronic signatures throughout
the member states, an important part of any authentication system.
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-ACCESSING THE
CONTENT OF FOREIGN LAW

On October 19-21, 2008, the Hague Conference on Private International Law convened
a meeting of experts to discuss global co-operation for disseminating digital legal
information. Experts attending the session represented stakeholders and providers from
the library and information communities, educational institutions, legal information
institutes ("free access to law" movement), legal community, and others, including
individuals from the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. One of the purposes of the conference was to assist with the preparation of a
feasibility study on the "development of a new instrument for cross-border co-operation
concerning the treatment of foreign law."
The attending experts developed guiding principles as part of the feasibility study on
this access to foreign law project. Several of these guiding principles deal with integrity and
authoritativeness of legal information, and one guiding principle deals with preservation.
These relevant guiding principles are:
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State parties are encouraged to make available authoritative versions of their legal
materials provided in electronic form.
State parties are encouraged to take all reasonable measures available to them to
ensure that authoritative legal materials can be reproduced or re-used by other bodies
with clear indications of their origins and integrity (authoritativeness).
State parties are encouraged to remove obstacles to the admissibility of these materials
in their courts.
State parties are encouraged to ensure long-term preservation and accessibility of
their legal materials referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. 18

The Hague Conference report cites the State-by-State Report on Authentication of Online
Legal Resources published by the American Association of Law Libraries.
Many individual countries, including Australia, Austria, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada,
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore,
and Spain, have passed digital signature laws. Most are similar in terms of the content.
For example, Finland's digital signature law, the Act on Electronic Service in the
Administration, defines the scope and structure of the elements of a PKI for digital
signature and identifies specific exclusions, including the use of digital certificates for
the application to administrative judicial procedures. Other countries, such as Brazil, use
digital signatures to vouch for the authenticity of legal materials online. The Supreme

18
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Accessing the Content of Foreign Law: No l lB-Report of the Meeting
of Experts on Global Co-operation on the Provision of Online Legal Information on National Laws-Annex (The Hague, Oct.
19-21, 2008), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pdllb2009e.pdf.
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Court of Justice in Brazil now publishes its decisions online with digital signatures affixed
to them as an indication of their authenticity.

: Strategies and

Steps

With more widespread recognition of authentication as a concern with digital government
information, some action is underway. However, increased efforts are needed to address
this rapidly growing problem. Initiatives are needed in the education, technology,
legislative, and advocacy arenas. Particularly at the state or provincial level, opportunities
for advocacy with legislators, judges, and other government officials should be explored.
Librarians in all types of libraries should note the needs of their users for authentic
government information and should share examples of situations where the integrity of
sources has come into question. In the legal community, such examples might include
situations in which evidentiary issues have been raised by attorneys and courts concerning
unofficial, unauthenticated government sources of law in digital format.
Some recent progress and some ongoing and potential activities are outlined below.

EDUCATION
After its groundbreaking State-by-State Report on Authentication of Online Legal
Resources, the American Association of Law Libraries convened a very successful National
Summit on Authentication of Digital Legal Information in April 2007. Summit delegates
included a carefully selected group of law librarians, judges, and representatives from
the American Bar Association, and state and federal government officials, all of whom
had expertise or interest in authentication issues. Also participating were technology
and security experts who were able to speak knowledgeably about the authentication
technology available in 2007. Since organizing and hosting the Summit, the AALL has
taken further action, including the following efforts currently underway:
"

"
"

"

"

Working with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
research and draft a uniform act about authentication that could be distributed to
state legislatures;
Establishing state working groups to begin discussing the importance of the
authentication issue with state legislators and other state government officials;
Building alliances with other library associations, national and state, to enlist the
support of librarians who are familiar with both legal and other types of governmentissued information;
Presenting programs about authentication at association conferences, including those
held by the AALL itself, the Virginia Library Association, and the National Center for
State Courts' Court Technology Conference; and
Publishing articles about the authentication issue and the issues associated with
non-authenticated digital information in journals directed to judges, lawyers, other
librarians, technology groups, etc.

Importantly, AALL members, under the guidance of the Association's Electronic Legal
Information Access and Citation Committee, in 2009-2010 revisited the previous state-
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by-state research and published updates to information provided in the 2007 report,
noting progress or lack thereof for each state in regard to authentication of primary
legal materials in digital format. These updates indicate that a few states have made
changes to online legal publications, including adding official and authentic notations,
making digital information more accessible, and even eliminating print publications
in favor of online only. The updates show that since the 2007 report, four additional
states have eliminated the print version of a legal publication in favor of exclusively
digital format. Eight states have made changes to the availability of their official digital
legal information by taking steps such as designating the digital version as the official
version and time-stamping to certify court decisions as authentic. Four additional states
now guarantee permanent public access to online state legal information, and two
additional states have adopted a new vendor-neutral citation format for citing legal
materials in their states, primarily court opinions. Another significant change noted in
the 2009-2010 updates is that many more states have added disclaimers to their state
websites, pointing out that the online content is for informational purposes and is not
warranted as official and/or completely accurate. The addition of these disclaimers is
almost certainly a direct result of AALL highlighting in its 2007 report the need for such
explanations.
Other recent efforts to educate and inform about authentication include the following.
In 2000 the Council on Library and Information Resources highlighted the importance
of the authentication of government-issued information by convening a conference
on authenticity and publishing the proceedings in a report entitled Authenticity in a
Digital Environment. In 2005 the United States Government Printing Office issued its
Authentication White Paper in preparation for its work with FDsys. In 2008 the European
Legal E-Access Conference was held in Paris, France, and one session focused on access to
legislation in Europe. The speakers identified the many projects from 2004-2008 taken
by European countries to (a) modernize the production of legislation and the workflow of
legislative process; (b) increase the reliability of electronic official gazette and to confirm
its legal status; (c) replace gradually the paper version with authentic electronic version;
(d) provide easy access to electronic legislation; and (e) produce consolidated electronic
legislation. 19 As mentioned earlier, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
convened its meeting of experts in 2008 to address authentication as part of its feasibility
study on an access to foreign law project. The experts developed guiding principles, and
the Hague Conference later released three reports as a result of this meeting, including
the experts' responses to an authentication question. 20

LEGISLATIVE
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) continues
its work on a uniform act about authentication and preservation to present to state
legislatures. A NCCUSL working group was established in 2008 and concluded its research
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AkiHietanenandMarikaSeppius, LexElectronique, LexAuthentique, Lex Consolidee,EuropeanLegalE-AccessConference
(Paris, France, Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.legalaccess.eu/IMG/pdf/OO_seppiusparis08seppiushietanen.pdf.
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Hague Conference on Private International Law, Accessing the Content of Foreign Law: No. llC-Compilation of
Responses to the Questionnaire of October 2008 For the Meeting of Experts On Global Co-operation on the Provision of Online
Legal Infonnation on National Laws (The Hague, Oct. 19-21, 2008), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_
pdllb2009e.pdf.

150 Government Information Management in the 21st Century

in 2009 with a recommendation that NCCUSL form a Drafting Committee to draft a
uniform law describing minimum standards for the authentication and preservation of
online state legal materials. The Drafting Committee's prefatory notes to its current draft
of Authentication and Preservation of State Electronic Legal Materials Act conclude
... this [act] addresses the critical need to manage electronic legal information in a
manner that guarantees the trustworthiness of and continuing access to important
state documents .... A [uniform act] will allow state governments to develop similar
systems of authentication and preservation, aiding the free flow of information
across state lines and the sharing of experiences and expertise to keep costs as low
· as possible.
Importantly, section 5 of the draft act states that electronic legal materials, if they are
authenticated in the manner set forth in the draft act, are presumed "to be a true and
correct copy of the legal material."
The Drafting Committee presented its May 2010 draft of the uniform act to the Committee
of the Whole of the NCCUSL on July 15, 2010. The Committee of the Whole debated the
draft act, raising several questions and offering numerous comments. The main outcomes
of the Commissioners' debates were a request for clarification of the relationship between
the state's official publishers and commercial publishers, a desire by the Commissioners to
include free access to preserved, historical materials as an option, and a clearer explanation
regarding the Drafting Committee's intention regarding the effective date of the act. After
the first reading and debate, the Committee of the Whole accepted the report of the Drafting
Committee, including the draft uniform act. It also asked the Drafting Committee to meet
again and consider the comments and questions from the Committee of the Whole. The
Drafting Committee met in November 2010 to discuss an updated interim draft of the
uniform act based on the comments of the Committee of the Whole and Drafting Committee
members. The Drafting Committee reviewed and considered the questions and comments
raised by the Committee of the Whole in July 2010 and debated additional questions and
concerns raised by the Drafting Committee members. The Drafting Committee reporter and
chair will prepare a revised draft uniform act based on the November 2010 meeting, will
meet again in February 2011, and subsequently will prepare a revised draft uniform act to
present to the Committee of the Whole again in July 2011.
The European Legal E-Access Conference session described earlier outlines many
legislative actions affecting authentication that have occurred in Europe. Notably, France
established a new kind of chain of custody (confidence) in the production of its Le Journal
Officiel. Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have established new workflow
processes and tools for legislative drafting that establish complete chain of custody and
use different data formats that can be authenticated. Greece has established secure server
protocol, and the electronic text (PDF) of its gazette carries an integrated electronic
signature and is, therefore, considered authentic. Austria, Denmark, and Spain publish
no paper copies of their legal gazettes, and the electronic versions are the only authentic
versions. Slovenia uses digital signatures with the electronic version of its Uradni list
Republike Slovenije, which is, therefore, as authentic as the paper version. Hungary has
implemented authentication of its electronic official gazette.
Two items would greatly benefit the authentication efforts of many governments:
standards and best practices manuals. While it may be too early for the development of
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a comprehensive and widely-accepted set of authentication standards, in their absence
it would be helpful to governments pursuing authentication if some entity, either
within or outside government, would compile and publish a "best practices manual."
Such a manual could provide examples and guidance gleaned from state governments
and countries that are currently authenticating and preserving their government-issued
information, providing possible models for others to follow. Currently, no such manual
exists, although the documents cited in the references and additional readings section
of this chapter, when reviewed collectively, could certainly assist those who are trying to
develop such best practices.
One issue that arises when discussing authentication is whether all government
information requires the same high level of authentication or whether there are certain
types of information that merit full authentication, while a lesser standard might be
adequate and reasonable for other types of information. As discussed previously in this
chapter, legal information is one category for which the highest level of authentication is
essential. Other categories for which a high level of assurance is necessary are government
research data, budgetary information, and statistics. The integrity and chain of custody
for these categories of information must be assured. If necessary, a lesser standard of
assurance might be justified for information of a less-sensitive nature or information,
which is frequently updated or replaced. Another question is: what would the different
levels of authentication be? Are some types of digital government information ephemeral,
requiring no intentional authentication? If authentication is possible for some, but not
all, categories of government information, how should government publishers prioritize
the provision of authentication? Much more discussion needs to occur on these matters.
TECHNOLOGY

Technology to authenticate digital government information is currently available. For
purposes of electronic commerce, governments in many countries have implemented
systems using digital signatures. However, in most instances those same governments
have been slow to employ similar technological or other means to ensure that the legal
and other information they produce in digital format is authenticated and reliable. These
governments have been particularly concerned about the potential costs associated
with implementing and maintaining authentication systems. An additional concern
to governments is how quickly various types of technology become obsolete. For
example, some technologists by late 2010 were regarding Message-Digest algorithm 5
(MDS), mentioned earlier in the chapter and used by Utah to confirm the integrity of
its administrative code and other administrative publications, as an obsolete technology
that no longer provides sufficient assurances.
At least one technological initiative is necessary-governments need to adopt
relevant existing standards and assist in the development of additional standards for
authentication. One aspect of this initiative is a determination by governments regarding
how much standardization is necessary. Efforts among member states in the European
Union are leading the technology initiative. Those member states have taken significant
steps through the European Legal E-Access Conference to address standards. Also, the
experts at the Hague Conference on Private International Law 11 Accessing the Content
of Foreign Law" meeting identified the following as one of their guiding principles:
"State parties are encouraged to cooperate in the development of common standards
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for metadata applicable to legal materials, particularly those intended to enable and
encourage interchange. 11 In fact, one of the experts at the Hague Conference commented,
"I also hope that the Hague Conference can become a stakeholder in helping to create a
standard for the authentication of official digital law." 21
Furthermore, article 8 of the NCCUSL draft uniform act addresses the question
of standards: "In implementing the requirements of this act, the official publisher
shall consider: (1) standards and practices of other jurisdictions; (2) any standards on
authentication and preservation of records adopted by national standard-setting bodies;
and (3) the needs of electronic records users." In the comments after this article, the
NCCUSL stresses the importance of efficiency in order to encourage states within the
United States to communicate and coordinate the development of authentication,
preservation, and permanent access standards. The NCCUSL also suggests that national
organizations consider the promulgation of best practices statements and standards and
share their work. NCCUSL concludes its comments with this statement: "International
organizations may also be tackling this issue and, to the extent that their work is relevant
to the US states, it could also be considered. 1122
For such sharing to be effective, governments in all countries should do more than
simply consider what other governments are doing. They should work together to establish
national and international best practices and standards and then adopt procedures and
processes to implement those practices and standards. Certainly, governments should
consider the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) XML authentication standards and the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 5652 digital signature standards. As some people
have pointed out, any government that is adopting XML for its government information
is effectively creating a standard as well.
ADVOCACY

Cooperative efforts by librarians and their professional organizations are needed to
convince governments of the importance of authenticating and preserving their digital
information and to provide examples of cost-effective means to do so. Lobbying efforts
with government legislative bodies are crucial. To accomplish this goal, librarians and
library organizations must build alliances with other groups and must extend the scope of
their alliances to include groups with whom librarians may not have worked previously.
For example, in the United States, the American Association of Law Libraries, recognizing
the importance of working with groups such as the Council of State Governments, the
American Bar Association, the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, state archivists, and groups of
judges, has been developing those relationships. The AALL also has created state working
groups to ensure access to digital legal information by taking three actions: (1) oppose
any plan to eliminate state official print legal resources unless the digital version is
authenticated and preserved permanently; (2) ensure that a disclaimer is added to any
legal resources on state websites, indicating that the information is not official or authentic
if the state has not taken actions to make the information official and authentic; and (3)
21

Id. at 59.

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Law Commission), Prefat01y Note,
22
Authentication and Preservation of State Electronic Legal Materials Act (2010).
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participate in the development of a national inventory of all primary legal resources at
every level of government.
Leaders in other disciplines such as science and medicine need to be engaged in
discussions on the importance of authentication of government data and statistics on
which their work depends. Members of the public must be made aware of the difference
between government information that appears on a commercial website and the
authenticated version of that same information found on a government website - that
they can rely on the latter but not the former. Librarians and library organizations must
develop marketing and promotional materials that indicate clearly why authentication
of government-issued information is such an important issue and how it affects the daily
lives of citizens, as well as lawyers, judges, researchers, scholars, and government officials.
Keeping attention focused on authentication must be a collaborative effort; an
alliance of advocates is more likely to be effective than groups working individually. It
would certainly be beneficial for additional stakeholders to be engaged in advocacy on
authentication. For example, the library and information community, governments, and
others interested in authenticating digital government information in various countries
might benefit by partnering with the "free access to law" movement. "Free access to law" is
the umbrella designation for a collection of legal information institutes (Llls) throughout
common law countries that have been organized to provide free and open online access
to legal information, such as case law, statutes, and regulations. Many legal information
institutes throughout the world, including the World Legal Information Institute, the
Australasian Legal Information Institute, the British and Irish Legal Information Institute,
the Canadian Legal Information Institute, and the Southern African Legal Information
Institute, are part of this "free access to law" movement.
In October 2002, the LIIs met in Montreal at the Fourth Law via Internet Conference
and issued a joint statement of their philosophy of access to the law, including the
following three points:

"
"

Public legal information from all countries and international institutions is part of
the common heritage of humanity. Maximizing access to this information promotes
justice and the rule of law;
Public legal information is digital common property and should be accessible to all
on a non-profit basis and free of charge;
Independent non-profit organizations have the right to publish public legal
information and the government bodies that create or control that information
should provide access to it as that it can be published.

Providing access to digital information is a significant goal of the LIIs. An equally significant
goal should be ensuring that the information used by citizens is authentic, reliable, and
trustworthy. It seems reasonable that the "free access to law" movement has a major
stake in the authentication of digital government information and could be a cooperative
partner for librarians and others in efforts to ensure that the information accessible
through LIIs is reliable and trustworthy. At a recent workshop at Princeton University
about open government and transparency, a participant, who also is a leader in the "free
access to law" movement, made the connection between the free access movement and the
authentication issue in his remarks. When discussing his Law.gov project, he emphasized
the importance of lobbying the US federal government for the authentication of digital
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legal information by requiring
each law-making federal entity to authenticate all
digital legal information it produces." 23 Many others from the Llls would likely join him
in collaborating with librarians and others in lobbying efforts with government legislative
bodies to emphasize the importance of the authentication issue.
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Summary and Conclusion
References a

Digital authentication of government-issued information is not yet a widespread practice,
although procedures to do so are becoming more common, especially in Europe. Until
a government can ensure that a digital document it issues is exactly what the document
purports to be, reliance on that digital version carries an inherent risk. This is a particular
concern with certain types of information, such as primary sources of the law-court
opinions, legislative enactments and administrative regulations-but also for statistical
and research data of interest to those in other disciplines.
In 2006 a law partner with a large United States law firm described the digitization
of information as a "societal sea change." Using legal materials, information records,
photographs, and other types of evidence that an attorney might want to introduce
into court proceedings as examples, he expressed concern about the lack of authenticity
of digital materials and images. He concluded: "Now, more purely stored and easily
manipulated information is pervasive in our society's informational records. All these
records-used to document communications, transactions and the appearance of
reality-must be capable of 'authenticity testing.' Otherwise, tribunals will be unable to
provide their most basic functions." 24 Courts, he continued, must face the fact that the
old authenticity paradigms, such as seals and the printed format, are disappearing, and
judges and court administrators must encourage legislators and others to come up with
solutions for authentication, which might possibly turn out to be superior to the old
paradigms.
The Association of Reporters of Judicial Decisions (ARJD) came to a similar conclusion
in 2007 in its Statement of Principles: "Official" On-Line Documents (revised in 2008):
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are disappearing quickly as governments switch to making their information available
exclusively in digital format. Without the necessary authentication, citizens cannot
trust government-issued information and can never be sure that the information is
what it purports to be. Governments have an obligation to authenticate the information
they issue by adopting appropriate practices, standards, and technology to ensure its
trustworthiness and reliability.
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